Humans and other animals make decisions in order to satisfy their goals. However, it remains 21 unknown how neural circuits compute which of multiple possible goals should be pursued (e.g. 22 when balancing hunger and thirst) and combine these signals with estimates of available reward 23 alternatives. Here, humans undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 24 accumulated two distinct assets over a sequence of trials. Financial outcomes depended on the 25 minimum cumulate of either asset, creating a need to maintain "value homeostasis" by 26 redressing any imbalance among the assets. BOLD signals in the dorsal anterior cingulate 27 cortex (dACC) tracked the level of homeostatic imbalance among goals, whereas the 28 ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) signalled the level of homeostatic redress incurred by 29 a choice, rather than the overall amount received. These results suggest that a network of medial 30 frontal brain regions compute a value signal that maintains homeostatic balance among internal 31 goals. 32 33 3
number of animals on offer ("offer" screen), the number of animals chosen ("choice" screen) and the 83 number of animals in the zoo ("feedback") are shown numerically above a picture of a lion and elephant. 84
Coloured circles (top) indicate the zoos (blocks) for the current run, with the central circle coloured 85
according to the current block. The central number indicates the number of trials (including the current 86 trial) remaining before the end of the block, i.e. the "countdown". Trialwise reward was indicated on 87 the feedback screen as the minimum of the two assets. Background screens were grey during testing, 88
but are shown in white here for illustration. (B) Black circle indicates average earnings as fraction of 89 maximum possible; black error bars are standard error of the mean (SEM) and grey circles show the 90 data from individual participants. Other markers indicate averaged reward fractions for various models. 91 (C) Beta coefficients from a logistic regression of various predictors on choice to redress. Bar height 92
indicates mean beta, error bars are SEM, grey circles represent individual participant data. Significance 93 was assessed using a two-tailed t-test against zero. *** is p < 0.001, ** is p < 0.01, * is p < 0.05. 94 95 Behavioral data. Participants received 84.3% of the maximum attainable cumulative reward 96 as calculated by numerical simulation (see Methods; Fig. 1b ). This was significantly better 97 than chance (mean: 59.6%, Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p < 0.001), than a fixed strategy of always 98 choosing the higher offer ("greedy"; mean: 74.3%, p < 0.001), and than a model that used a different value codes described in the paper for three example trials. The "current assets" panel depicts 140 the state of assets before participants made a choice, whereas the "current offer" depicts the available 141 choices. The panel to the right shows the values of the three value codes used for analyses depending 142 on choice: Receipt value reflected the increase in the overall number of animals achieved by choice. 143
Goal receipt value codes the receipt value in the frame of reference of the goal. Finally, redress value 144 encodes the realized redress between the goals or, equivalently, the increase in trial reward. It is 145 computed as min (receipt value, goal difference) if participants chose according to their needs, or zero 146 otherwise. (B) Positive correlation between offer difference (high minus low) and BOLD signals in the 147 medial PFC, sagittal slice at x = 6. (C) Positive correlation of goal difference with voxels on the same 148 slice as in A). (D) Encoding of receipt value in voxels rendered on a coronal slice at y = 12. (E) 149
Encoding of goal receipt value on a sagittal slice at x = 10 (F) Encoding of redress value on a sagittal 150 slice at x = 2. Voxels were thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected. (G) Correlation matrix for the three 151 value codes. 152 153 VmPFC encodes a value redress signal. Outcomes were deterministic in our task, and so 154 participants knew the consequences of their choices as soon as they were made. Previous 155 research has reliably demonstrated that vmPFC encodes reward outcome, but left open the 156 question of how current needs may impact this encoding. Thus, we designed our task to 157 dissociate three possible frames of reference for the outcome signal that might be computed on 158 each trial: the total number of animals received independent of need (receipt value), the number 159 of animals received in the frame of reference of need (goal receipt value), and the level of 160 redress (redress value). To illustrate, consider a participant with 10 lions and 12 elephants in 161 their zoo who receives 3 more lions. The receipt value (and goal receipt value) would be 3, 162 whereas the redress value would be 2. However, if the participant chose 2 more elephants, the 163 receipt value would be 2, and the goal receipt value and redress value would be zero (see Fig.   164 2a for an illustration). By design, receipt value and redress value were only weakly correlated 165 (r = 0.23, R 2 < 0.06; correlation matrix Fig. 2g ) and thus dissociable. Note that redress value 166 does not equal the monetary reward received on a given trial, but rather encodes the expected 167 increase in reward conditional on the choice. 168 We let these three value regressors compete for variance in the BOLD signal at the time of 169 choice (GLM2). Receipt value positively activated clusters in the bilateral dorsal striatum 170 (caudate nucleus), extending into ventral striatum (peak: -6, 12, 2; cluster -FDRq < 1 x 10 -6 ; Fig. 2d ). Goal receipt value was negatively correlated with an area in the dorsal ACC (BA 24; 172 peak: 14, 28, 26; cluster -FDRq < 0.05 Fig. 2e ). By contrast, redress value activated a cluster 173 in the vmPFC (peak: 6, 52, 2, cluster -FDRq < 0.001; Fig. 2f ) and the posterior cingulate 174 cortex (peak: -6, -60, 14, cluster-FDRq < 0.005), two regions that are often found to coactivate 175 in value-based decision tasks 4 (see Tables S3-5 for full results) . This association between 176 redress value and vmPFC signals was also observed when we coded redress value relative to 177 unchosen redress, in line with the previous observation that the vmPFC codes for the value of 178 a chosen relative to an unchosen alternative 25, 26 . Moreover, when we took the conservative 179 approach of first orthogonalising this relative redress value with respect to the other two 180 predictors, ensuring that any effect of redress value must be over and above the other two value 181 codes, we observed the same triple dissociation in dorsal striatum, dACC and vmPFC ( Fig. S2,   182 Tables S6-8). Finally, we used a non-circular ROI approach to test whether the vmPFC simply 183 coded for the monetary reward observed on each trial by testing whether it encoded the level 184 of the lower (reward-determining) asset at the time of choice, but found that this was not the 185 case (t20 = 0.02, p > 0.98; GLM3). We thus conclude that vmPFC encodes the level of 186 homeostatic redress incurred by a choice.
187
Together, thus, we find that the dorsal striatum, dACC and vmPFC fulfilled dissociable roles 188 in value encoding in our task. The dorsal striatum encoded the number of animals received 189 irrespective of needs (receipt value), whereas one region in the dACC (BA 24) participated in 190 encoding goal difference (the need to redress assets) and the goal receipt value (the outcome 191 value in the frame of reference of needs). In contrast, the vmPFC encoded the redress in 192 homeostatic imbalance incurred by a given choice, i.e. the extent to which internal needs were 193 returned to a balanced state by a given choice.
194
Computational model and optimal policy. To ask how an agent should behave in order to 195 maximise reward in our task, we used dynamic programming (DP) to compute the policy that will maximise expected future return over each zoo. DP searches through possible future states 197 and chooses a reward-maximising action according to the expected future return, assuming 198 optimal subsequent choices. Because it accounts for possible future offers up to the horizon 199 defined by the end of the zoo, the DP algorithm will sometimes choose the immediately less 200 needed option in order to maximize overall return. For instance, where an offer of the asset not 201 immediately required is generous, it may be sensible to nevertheless choose that asset, to guard 202 against future scarcity when the offer probabilities reverse. This policy will be less useful at 203 the end of the block, because such future benefits are curtailed when the zoo ends.
204
Armed with this computational tool, we first computed the upper bound on reward shown in 205 Fig. 1b , as reported above. Next, we asked whether humans, like the model, considered 206 potential time horizon when choosing to defer an immediate redress in asset imbalance. We 207 found that they did: as for the DP model, proximity to the end of a zoo (defined as 1/countdown) 208 positively predicted redress responses (t20 = 3.74, p < 0.005) and that this tendency was stronger 209 when the goal difference was greater (t20 = 3.13, p < 0.01). However, this was not driven by 210 the overall length of the zoo alone, which failed to predict redress probability (t20 = 1.26, p > 211 0.22). Next, we evaluated choices made by the DP model using the same logistic regression 212 approach. Despite some similarities in the betas obtained between humans and the DP model, 213 the latter exhibited a stronger impact on p(redress) of both offer value and proximity to the end 214 of the zoo (Fig. S3) . 215 These findings might be explained if humans adopt a strategy that is approximately optimal 216 but myopic i.e. has insufficient search depth when computing expected future return. We thus 217 reimplemented the DP model, but allowed the planning horizon (in steps) to vary as a free 218 parameter, as well as the subjective reversal probability, and policy terms that allow for bias 219 and choice variability. When we fit the output of this "myopic" DP models to participants 220 choices using maximum likelihood estimation with five-fold cross-validation (one fold per 221 scanner run), we found that, on average, participants estimated the reversal probability to be 222 approximately 0.44 (SD = 0.33) and planned only 7.5 trials ahead (SD = 6.04), significantly 223 lower than the theoretical value of 20. The overall model log-likelihood was -2047.2, which 224 was lower than both the logistic regression model with proximity (7 parameters; LL = -2111.1) 225 and without proximity (4 parameters; LL = -2189.2), and the DP model was strongly favoured 226 by Bayesian model selection (exceedance probability = 0.99).
227
This best-fitting (but myopic) DP model was also able to reproduce several qualitative features 228 of the data. First, it captured how the average probability of redress varied with proximity to 229 the end of the block (Fig. 3a) . Second, it captured how the average homeostatic need to redress 230 (i.e. tolerance for disparity among the two assets in the zoo) varied as a function of time for 231 blocks of different length, Fig. 3b . By contrast, a fully optimal DP model is more tolerant of 232 larger goal difference values in the middle portion of the block, indicative of a longer time 233 horizon for planning.
234
In conclusion, the DP analyses revealed that although humans planned for future needs, they 235 were suboptimal in two ways: firstly, they did not plan ahead sufficiently, and secondly, they 236 over-estimated the reversal probability. redress. In GLM3 we found that the rACC (BA 24) region covarying with goal difference (i.e.
251
the quantity that participants need to keep in homeostatic balance) also encoded the interaction 252 of the higher asset and proximity (negatively; t20 = -2.16, p < 0.05), but not of the lower asset 253 and proximity (t20 = 1.33, p > 0.19). Thus, encoding of the higher asset, and by extension goal 254 difference, decreased over time in this region ( Fig. 4b) . We also observed that a more posterior 255 region in the dmPFC (GLM1; peak: -36, 16, 50, cluster -FDRq < 0.001), as well as bilateral 256 angular gyri (left peak: -50, -48, 34; right peak: 54, -44, 38; cluster -FDRqs < 0.001), and 257 dorsolateral PFC (left peak: -34, 20, 46; right peak: 30, 4, 62; cluster -FDRqs < 0.001, Table   258 S9) encoded the main effect of proximity to the block end, independent of asset difference, as 259 if they were tracking the available time remaining to redress ( Fig. 4a) . Bars are mean parameter estimates from logistic regression, error bars are SEM. Significance was 267 assessed using a two-tailed t-test against zero. *** is p < 0.001, ** is p < 0.01, * is p < 0.05. 268 269 Finally, we asked whether single-trial activity (from GLM4) in the same rACC ROI (BA 24) 270 had an impact on behaviour. We constructed a logistic regression model in which choices to 271 redress were predicted by the two goal tallies, the rACC activity, and the interactions of rACC 272 with the goal tallies. Choices to redress were negatively predicted by the lower tally (t20 = -273 4.75, p < 0.0002), and this effect was accentuated when rACC signals were stronger (t20 = -274 2.11, p < 0.05), whereas choices to redress were predicted positively by the higher tally (t20 = 275 6.69, p < 1 x 10 -5 ), and this effect was also stronger when rACC was more active (t20 = 2.09, p 276 < 0.05; Fig. 4c) . No main effect of rACC activity was observed (t20 = -1.72, p > 0.10). Thus, 277 high rACC activity guided choices based on the current need to redress.
278

Discussion
279
We asked humans to perform a value-guided decision task required them to balance levels of 280 two possible assets ("value homeostasis"). We found that they did so strategically, basing their 281 choices about whether or not to redress or defer on the value of current offers, knowledge of 282 homeostatic imbalance, and the time horizon available for future redress. In other words, 283 humans make choices that actively arbitrate among current goals, and plan for possible future 284 scarcity. Our major contribution here is that considering this frame of reference for value 285 signals sheds new light on the function of key brain areas involved in reward-guided decision-286 making.
287
Previous studies have identified human BOLD responses that code for the economic value of 288 offers and outcomes in various frames of reference, observing for example that the vmPFC 289 codes positively for the value of a chosen option and negatively for an unchosen option, with 290 the reverse pattern observed in the dACC 4 . Other, less well-established frames of reference for 291 value signals have been observed, for example that vmPFC 27,28 and dACC 29 encodes value 292 relative to an average or default stimulus, or that they respectively signal the value of a 293 proximal choice, and the need to switch to a new context of known average value 30-32 . 294 However, these studies make a critical assumption that is uncharacteristic of the real world: 295 that choices are made to maximise momentary return given a single, monolithic value function, 296 rather than arbitrating among multiple possible goals which depend on internal needs or 297 cumulative assets. By contrast, here we start with the prediction that animals evolved not 298 simply to maximise momentary outcomes but to maintain a homeostatic balance among 299 multiple internal needs. This is the case not just for primary reinforcers that promote satiety 300 and hydration, but also for more complex, abstract needs, as when a busy academic balances 301 the goals of conducting impactful research and providing effective teaching. Our work sheds 302 new light on the function of three regions previously implicated in value-guided choice: the 303 dorsal and parts of the ventral striatum, vmPFC and dACC. We report a clear triple dissociation 304 between these regions, which is striking given that previous studies have largely suggested that 305 they jointly compute values of stimuli, actions and goals 33, 34 . 306 Firstly, the striatum responded to outcome magnitude (i.e. number of animals received), but 307 unlike cortical regions, it did so in a fashion that was insensitive to internal needsthe signal 308 went unmodulated by estimated cumulative assets. Previous studies have suggested that where 309 a single asset (e.g. money) is to be maximised, both vmPFC and striatum seem to code the 310 long-run average value of an action, and the value computed via tree search through future 311 states or outcomes 4,33,35 . These common value signals in cortical and subcortical regions may 312 reflect the fact that animals use a mixture of model-free and model-based information when 313 making decisions 33, 34, 36 . However, our work instead suggests that cortical systems compute 314 values in the frame of reference of ongoing internal needs, whereas the striatum codes for 315 overall receipt independent of internal needs. 316 Unlike previous studies, we found that the vmPFC did not code for outcomes per se, either in 317 the frame of reference of choices or contexts. Rather, it codes for homeostatic redressthat 318 is, the extent to which any given choice restores the imbalance among internal needs. This 319 signal remained the best explanation of vmPFC signals even when we partialled out the actual 320 outcome received in number of animals, or the trialwise monetary reward that motivated 321 participants to perform the task. We note that in our task, as in a natural environment where 322 wellbeing is determined by the minimum of multiple possible assets, redress value is inevitably 323 identical with the change in reward or hedonic value. This presumably explains the ubiquitous 324 observation that vmPFC correlates positively with reward outcome when a single asset is being 325 optimised, and why this signal is often observed to be modulated by the local context provided 326 by average value 28,37,38 .
327
These findings build on our previous work implicating the human vmPFC in coding an internal, 328 unsignalled representation of cumulative assets in a way that maximises a specific goal 329 (maintaining net positive aggregate reward), over and above any momentary hedonic value that 330 arises from choices 23 . However, the current work additionally implies why the brain keeps track 331 of cumulative assetsbecause this allows any imbalance among internal needs to be redressed 332 by future choices. This helps understand a perplexing paradox in the decision literaturehow 333 is it that neural signals in the vmPFC code ubiquitously for rewards, but lesions to the vmPFC 334 incur only subtle deficits where decisions involve maximisation of a single asset 39 ? The vmPFC 335 outcome signals ubiquitously observed in fMRI studies may reflect the tracking of redress 336 value to one of multiple potential goalsobtaining food, or money, or maximising accuracy -337 rather than computing the relative strength of one offer over another. Indeed, in studies of 338 navigation the vmPFC signal also ramps up over multiple steps that are made towards a 339 destination, presumably because each step redresses the distance between current and goal 340 state 40,41 . Thus, we would expect patients with vmPFC lesions to arbitrate effectively between 341 offers of differing value but to fail to allocate decisions strategically over the long term, 342 precisely the pattern that is observed in both humans and monkeys 15, 39 .
343
Perhaps the most interesting neural effects we report, however, are two dissociable value 344 signals in adjacent, and partially overlapping, ACC regions, which collectively imply that this 345 region participates in choosing which goal to pursue at any one time. Firstly, a cluster in BA24 346 responded to the current imbalance among assets, i.e. the extent to which one asset needed to 347 be replenished in order to match another. Furthermore, the amplitude of this signal was 348 predictive of choices to redress. Previous studies of reward-guided decisions have emphasised 349 that the dACC codes positively for the relative value of an "unchosen" option-i.e. that which 350 was foregone when a choice was made 26,42or that it signals the need to switch away from a 351 current context towards a new, potentially richer, source of rewards 30, 43 . Our suggestion that 352 the rACC and adjacent dACC encode homeostatic imbalance jointly explains these findings, 353 which respectively occur during instances of heightened value imbalance between one stimulus 354 and another, or one context and another. Moreover, lesions of the dACC lead monkeys to 355 switch away from a currently rewarding task, as if they had difficulty maintaining goal 356 value 44,45 . Secondly, an adjacent region in a more dorsal part of BA 24 signals the extent to 357 which an asset that is needed is replenished by a choice (goal receipt value). We note that this 358 signal is required to compute the vmPFC redress signal, when combined with knowledge of 359 cumulative assets. Together, these findings argue for a critical role for the ACC in computing 360 which of multiple possible goals should be pursued at any one time.
361
The choice of whether to satisfy an immediate need, or to build up less pressing resources to 362 offset future scarcity, is a ubiquitous problem for humans and other animals 46 . Critically, this 363 choice depends on the time horizon over which choices can be made: an optimal agent with 364 knowledge of the time horizon will tolerate an asset imbalance early in the block, where it can 365 be later redressed if opportunities change, but respond to pressure to redress later in the block.
366
Human participants were less tolerant of imbalance than the optimal model, which can be 367 explained if they are somewhat myopic in their planning. Note, however, that this is akin to, 368 and indistinguishable from a parameter discounting future rewards in favour of short-term gain.
369
Nevertheless, reversal probability, planning horizon and an alternative discount parameter 370 would all predict that participants chose to redress more than was optimal, especially at the 371 early stages of the block. Consistent with this view, the BA24 ROI that coded for goal 372 difference did so in a fashion that varied with proximity to the end of the block. However, the 373 direction of this effect was somewhat surprising to us, in that goal difference encoding 374 decreases with time. It is possible that participants had a bias to redress towards the end 375 irrespective of the size of the goal differencethus, goal difference encoding may not be 376 needed to drive choice towards the final few trials in a block. Nevertheless, this finding requires 377 further corroboration in future studies.
378
Our findings may more generally have implications for understanding health and wellbeing in 379 humans. We assume that wellbeing is related to the minimum among current needs, and find 380 evidence that neural circuits for valuation and choice have evolved to maintain a balance 381 among needs via goal-directed choice. Disorders of valuation and choice, such as depression, 382 might be associated with failures of a system that attempts to maintain homeostatic imbalance, 383 such as an exaggerated representation of goal difference, or a failure to update internal asset 384 estimates when they are redressed. participants were first shown a fixation cross (150 ms), followed by a "choice" screen (2.5 507 seconds) in which they were offered a variable number of lions or elephants. This was indicated 508 by an arabic number above a drawing of the animal on the left and right of the screen. There 509 were always a high (4-6) offer of one animal and a low (1-3) offer of the other. The assignment 510 of high or low offers to each animal was autocorrelated over trials, reversing with a probability 511 of 0.3, which led to "streaks" in which one animal could be harvested in more abundance.
512
Participants indicated their choice by pressing a button with their left or right index finger (for 513 options on the left and right, respectively). The side on which each animal was offered varied 514 randomly across trials. Once a choice was made, the unchosen option disappeared from the 515 screen, leaving only the chosen option ("response" screen), and this lasted the remainder of the 516 trial (2.5s minus reaction time), followed by a blank screen for a uniformly jittered interval 517 (1.5-4.5 seconds). Subsequently, a feedback screen (1 second) indicated the number of animals 518 of each species in the zoo (the "assets") as a number above the respective drawing. Trial-wise 519 reward was indicated below the drawings and was directly proportional to the lower asset (e.g. 520 it was 5 if there were 10 elephants and 5 lions in the zoo). Inter-trial intervals were drawn 521 uniformly between 2s and 6s (1-3 time of repetition; TR).
522
Throughout the run, five coloured discs just below the top of the screen were shown, 523 representing in the 5 zoos ordered from left to right in time. Each zoo had a colour, and the 524 colour of the current zoo was indicated by a central circle that appeared on the "choice" and 525 "response" screens. Colours were drawn randomly on each run and were only included to aide 526 participants in grouping trials into discrete blocks. During the "choice" and "response" phases 527 of the trial, a central number was displayed within the circle, also in a colour matching the 528 colour of the current zoo. This number counted down the trials still remaining in the current 529 zoo (including the current trial). At the conclusion of a block, its cumulative earnings were 530 displayed on a "bonus" screen and this number was shown underneath the corresponding 531 coloured disc on all subsequent trials. A lottery at the end of each run displayed to participants 532 which of these bonuses was chosen as extra payment. Each block had equal probability of being 533 selected in the lottery.
534
Training and instruction. Participants completed one run immediately before scanning to 535 familiarize themselves with the task. They were told that if lions were currently the high offer, 536 they were more likely to be the high offer on the following trial, but that this was not certain 537 and this contingency could reverse unpredictably. However, they were not told the exact 538 reversal probability (0.3). They were also told that they would receive the sum of the lottery 539 values across runs after the end of the experiment.
540
Analysis of behavior 541
All analyses were carried out using MATLAB 8.6 (R2015b) and custom in-house code.
542
Choices were coded as "redress" when participants chose the offer corresponding to the We developed a Markov model to derive the optimal solution for the task. The model's state 564 space was given by the goal difference, the number of trials left in the block, the two offers in 565 the frame of reference of the lower asset, and the reversal probability (constant for all models, 566 except when fitting to participants). The model was optimized using the following dynamic (R(s,a) ) 573 and the expected value of the best action in all subsequent states. As the task had a finite 574 horizon, we do not include a discount factor. We fit the model with different reversal 575 probabilities (from 0 in increments of 0.05 to 1, where 0.3 was the true value) in order to 576 compare it to participants' behaviour. As the model computed the expected value for both 577 choosing to redress and choosing to defer, we computed the difference between the two and 578 passed it through a sigmoid to allow for noisy decisions. The output of this sigmoidp(redress)
579
-was then fit to participant's behaviour with a weighting parameter and intercept using 580 maximum likelihood estimation. Maximum possible reward was calculated by permuting 581 across all possible combinations of choices in each sequence and finding the highest reward 582 score. 583 584 FMRI Data Acquisition and pre-processing 585 MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens scanner. T1 weighted structural images were 586 recorded directly prior to the task using an MPRAGE sequence: 1x1x1mm 3 voxel resolution, 587 176x256x256 grid, TR = 1900ms, TE = 2.52ms, TI = 900ms. Each fMRI image contained 32 588 axial echo-planar images (EPI) acquired in descending sequence with a voxel resolution of 3.5 589 mm isotropic, slice spacing of 4.2mm, TR = 2000ms, flip angle = 80, and TE of 30ms. 1850 590 EPI images were recorded per participant, resulting in a scanning time of around 62 minutes.
591
Data were pre-processed using SPM12 (Wellcome Trust, London). As EPI acquisition used a 592 descending sequence, images were corrected for slice time acquisition with the middle slice (at 593 TR/2 = 1 s) as reference to minimize interpolation errors 47 . Scans were realigned to the first 594 scan within each session. The anatomical scan was co-registered to the mean functional image.
595
Anatomical scans were normalized to the standard MNI152 template brain and smoothed with 596 a 4mm full width half maximum Gaussian kernel. The functional EPI images were then 597 normalized and smoothed with a full width half maximum Gaussian kernel of 8mm. 598 599 FMRI data analysis 600 Data were analysed using SPM12 and custom scripts. Data from the five scanning sessions 601 were concatenated and constants identifying each run were added manually to the GLM in 602 order to account for potential differences in mean activation and scanner drift. Stimulus onsets 603 were incremented by 1s to account for slice time correction to the middle slice, which occurred 604 at TR/2 = 1s after stimulus onset 47 . Micro time onset was adjusted to the first slice. All results 605 reported came from GLMs in which the canonical haemodynamic response function was 606 convolved with a delta function (i.e. with zero seconds duration) time-locked to event onset 607 (e.g. offer or feedback screen). The six vectors of motion parameters derived from pre-608 processing were included as nuisance regressors. Automatic orthogonalization was disabled.
609
Group-level contrasts were constructed as simple t-contrasts using subject-level contrast 610
